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I. THE WEATHER ON GAME DAY: INTRODUCTION 
The Black Lives Matter (BLM) Movement demands equality, justice, 
and, perhaps most importantly, accountability.1 Because of the abuse of 
power by governmental officials, particularly by those charged with law 
enforcement, we have seen many protests in Portland and elsewhere that 
invoke the First Amendment “right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”2 This, of 
course, is one of the essential elements of the Bill of Rights, which was 
ratified by the States in 1791. We saw a unique development in the Trump 
Administration unprecedented since President Eisenhower sent federal 
troops into the public schools of Little Rock, Arkansas to support 
desegregation.3 This article addresses federal involvement in the BLM 
protests. 
“Little Green Men” is an ascription that was used to describe Russian 
troops who, without insignia or other identification aside from their green 
camouflage uniforms, sneaked into Crimea, Ukraine, overthrowing the 
government there, and occupying the entire Crimean Peninsula, such 
occupation continuing to this day.4 The federal agents who were involved 
in suppressing BLM protests, first in Lafayette Square across the street 
from the White House in Washington, D.C., and later, in Portland, Oregon, 
were very similar to the Little Green Men of Vladimir Putin.5 Such a 
phenomenon in the United States, however, was a very unusual 
 
1 See generally, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/. 
2 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
3 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12 (1958). 
4 Quinta Jurecic & Benjamin Wittes, Nothing Can Justify the Attack on Portland, THE 
ATLANTIC (July 21, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/nothing-
can-justify-attack-portland/614413/; see also Iryna Zaverukha, The Trajectory of Crimean 
Flight 2014: Falling Through the Cracks Between the Rock of ‘Refugee’ and the Hard 
Place of ‘Internally Displaced Person,’ 49 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 373, 389 (2016) 
(citing Steven Pifer, Watch out for Little Green Men, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 7, 2014), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/nato-needs-strategy-for-possible-meddling-
by-putin-in-baltic-states-a-979707.html). 
5 Katie Shepherd & Mark Berman, ʽIt was like being preyed upon’: Portland protesters 
say federal officers in unmarked vans are detaining them, WASHINGTON POST (July 17, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/17/portland-protests-federal-
arrests/; Mark Sumner, What Trump is doing in Portland is terrifying, and it is coming to 
a town near you, DAILY KOS (July 17, 2020), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2020/7/17/1961412/-What-Donald-Trump-is-doing-in-
Portland-is-just-as-big-a-threat-to-America-as-COVID-19; Jonathan Levinson & Conrad 
Wilson, Federal Law Enforcement Use Unmarked Vehicles to Grab Protesters Off 
Portland Streets, OREGON PUBLIC BROADCASTING (July 17, 2020), 
https://www.opb.org/news/article/federal-law-enforcement-unmarked-vehicles-portland-
protesters/. 
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development. The footage of those events is disturbing, to say the least.6 
It depicts United States federal agents forcibly removing any protestors in 
the area by force and using tear gas, ostensibly for the purpose of enabling 
former President Trump to have a photograph taken of him holding a Bible 
(reportedly upside down) in front of the church adjacent to Lafayette 
Square.7 
Of course, in the era of the coronavirus, tear gas is particularly 
problematic. It has the natural consequence of eliciting fluids from the 
body through tearing, nasal drip, coughing, and, in some cases, vomiting, 
which can, of course, result in the spreading of coronavirus.8 Tear gas was 
used by the federal agents in Portland, as were a variety of other techniques 
of crowd control.9 Most notably, rubber bullets were deployed in Portland 
by federal agents, which resulted in substantial harm.10 In some cases, 
people were hit directly in the face with rubber bullets.11 Video footage 
that was broadcast on the news showed one young man who was hit in the 
face, thereafter requiring surgery, and who was subsequently hospitalized 
for a number of days.12 
Other footage showed a middle-aged veteran who had a sweatshirt on 
with “NAVY” in large letters on the front and who was targeted with tear 
 
6 See Washington Post, A video timeline of the crackdown on protesters before Trump’s 
photo op | Visual Forensics, YOUTUBE (June 8, 2020) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JxYmILDya0A. 
7 See id. 
8 See Drew Marine, Environmental epidemiologist says exposure to tear gas could 
heighten someone’s chance of getting COVID-19, FOX 12 OREGON (July 23, 2020), 
https://www.kptv.com/news/environmental-epidemiologist-says-exposure-to-tear-gas-
could-heighten-someones-chance-of-getting-covid-19/article_bf4708b0-cd72-11ea-a20b-
ebce25307b7b.htm. Indeed, tear gas is prohibited in wartime use by international law. 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N. Treaty 
Series 65; 25 A.J.I.L. Supp. 94 (1931). 
9 See id. 
10 Liz Sabo et al., Fractured skulls, lost eyes: Police break their own rules when shooting 
protesters with rubber bullets, USA TODAY NEWS (June 19, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/nation/2020/06/19/police-break-rules-shooting-
protesters-rubber-bullets-less-lethal-projectiles/3211421001/. 
11 See Tracy Connor, VIDEO: Portland Protestor Shot in Face with Rubber Bullet, THE 
DAILY BEAST (July 12, 2020), https://www.thedailybeast.com/portland-protester-shot-in-
face-with-rubber-bullet. 
12 See Press Release, Jeff Merkley, U.S. Senator for Oregon, Wyden, Merkley, 
Blumenauer and Bonamici Demand Answers from DHS and DOJ After Federal Agent 
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gas at point blank range right in the face.13 If that were not outrageous 
enough, the veteran also suffered a broken bone as a result of the federal 
agents’ actions.14 The video reveals that he was not resisting at all,15 and 
also shocking is the fact that the victim simply allowed the battering by 
these agents.16 When he was gassed, he turned away, but they continued 
to beat him with batons and truncheons.17 In a video interview, he was 
shown bruised and with his broken leg bandaged.18 
There were also instances of federal agents targeting journalists and 
legal observers. Both were clearly identifiable as such, the journalists 
having large designations on their helmets (“PRESS”) and the legal 
observers with “ACLU LEGAL OBSERVER” on their backs.19 These 
people were seemingly targeted because of who they were, resulting in a 
federal lawsuit.20 An amended complaint added the federal officers as 
defendants, and thereafter Judge Michael Simon, the U.S. District Court 
judge who heard the case, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a 
temporary restraining order on July 23, 2020, against the federal 
defendants.21 
Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley and Members of the House of 
Representatives from the Oregon delegation, Suzanne Bonamici and Earl 
Blumenauer, signed a letter on July 14, 2020, which was sent to William 
Barr, the Attorney General of the United States, and Chad Wolfe, the 
Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. The letter 
stated: 
On Saturday July 11th, 2020 federal agents who we 
understand to be members of the DOJ (Department of 
Justice) U.S. Marshals Service Special Operations Group 
(SOG) deployed at the Hatfield federal courthouse in 
Portland, Oregon, fired a potentially deadly crowd control 
munition in apparent violation of commonly employed 
training tactics that direct officers to aim below the head 
and face area. An Oregonian suffered a resulting critical 
head injury and, since undergoing surgery, is now 
 
13 See CBS Sunday Morning, Navy Vet Christopher David Speaks on Portland Protests, 
YOUTUBE (July 26, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m4jMxwKk8rI. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1113, *1118 (D. Or. 
2020). 
20 See id. 
21 See id. at 1126-1127. 
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hospitalized. This is three days later. This use of force 
appeared from recorded accounts to be an unnecessary 
escalation on the part of federal agents.22 
There were many instances where such actions were recorded on 
videotape, and some were livestreamed on the news. Bringing law 
enforcement to account for unconstitutional actions has come a long way 
since we reached the age of videotape. In fact, there are many links to 
videotaped assaults by federal agents, city police, and State police troopers 
that were included as links in the complaint filed in Index Newspapers.23 
No one is suggesting that violence or any kind of criminal conduct by 
the protestors is acceptable. By and large, the overwhelming majority of 
the protests around the country and, indeed, the world, have been peaceful. 
A good example of peaceful protesting is the Portland protestors on the 
Morrison Bridge all getting down on one knee and maintaining that stance 
for a number of minutes in replication of the event of George Floyd and 
Derek Chauvin, the police officer who murdered him by kneeling on his 
neck for that period of time.24 
In the words of Justice Brandeis in the case of Olmstead v. United 
States: 
If the government becomes a lawbreaker[,] it breeds 
contempt for law for it invites every man to become a law 
unto himself. It invites anarchy to declare that, in the 
administration of the criminal law, the end justifies the 
means, would bring terrible retribution. Against that 
pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its 
face.25 
Those words are just as true today as they were in 1928 when they 
were uttered by Justice Brandeis. We have a situation where law 
enforcement agents are really out of control and breaking the law. 
The case filed by the State of Oregon against the federal presence in 
Portland was ultimately dismissed for lack of standing to sue the federal 
government for the deprivations of rights that were at issue in the 
 
22 Press Release, supra note 12. 
23 Second Amend. Complaint at ¶¶ 5,6,7,8,10, 99, 168, Index Newspapers LLC v. City 
of Portland, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Or. 2020). 
24 See Alex Cnossen, Moments of Peace, Love in Week 1 of George Floyd Protests, FOX 
12 OREGON (June 5, 2020), https://www.kptv.com/news/moments-of-peace-love-in-week-
1-of-protests-in-portland-for-george-floyd/article_5d0d33dc-a788-11ea-a835-
476f485d642d.html. 
25 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW 61 
 
protests.26 As in all cases, if there has been a deprivation of Constitutional 
rights, the threshold question is whether the plaintiff — the person harmed 
or injured — has a right to sue. Specifically, in cases involving federal 
defendants, the germane question is whether there is a right to sue for 
compensatory damages to redress the injuries suffered at the hands of law 
enforcement. 27 
II. THE KICKOFF: THE LANDMARK CASE OF BIVENS 
This threshold question of whether there is a right to sue, of whether 
there is a cause of action, to go into court and ask a federal judge to rule 
in favor of the plaintiff against the federal defendants for the purpose of 
granting that plaintiff damages for Constitutional violations, has been 
governed by the landmark case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.28 Decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1971, Bivens was a six-three decision the majority opinion of which was 
written by Justice Brennan.29 A significant concurring opinion was 
authored by Justice Harlan.30 The Supreme Court was deciding whether 
Bivens could be heard to sue for damages after federal agents, of the then 
Bureau of Narcotics, entered his home without a search warrant, rousted 
him from bed, manacled him in the presence of his family, turned the 
house upside down, took him off to jail, booked him, strip searched him, 
and yet ultimately released him without charge.31 
Of course, if he had been charged with a crime, this unconstitutional 
conduct could have been the subject of a motion to suppress any illegally 
obtained evidence.  Bivens, however, was never charged with a crime, so 
a motion to suppress offered in his defense was obviated. Another 
inapplicable mode of redress, injunctive relief, was equally unavailing, 
because an injunction would have required Bivens to demonstrate that it 
was likely that the Bureau of Narcotics would come a second time and 
undertake the same kind of illegal activity, therefore giving rise to a need 
for an injunction against this future conduct.32 Just as Justice Harlan said 
 
26 Rosenblum v. Does 1-10, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1128, 1137 (D. Or. 2020). 
27 See id. at 1132-33. 
28 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 389. 
31 Id. 
32 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 400 n.3 (Harlan, J. concurring); see also City of Los Angeles, v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 137 (1983). 
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in his concurring opinion, “for someone in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or 
nothing.”33 That was certainly true. 
The Court addressed the question of whether courts should recognize 
an implied cause of action for damages caused by Constitutional violations 
by federal agents, notwithstanding the fact that there is no statute 
conferring a right of action.34 The Court well understood that, if the 
unconstitutional actions had been undertaken by State or local law 
enforcement officers, Bivens could have sued using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Section 1983 confers no substantive rights but 
does confer a right of action to sue for deprivation of federal rights, 
whether they be Constitutional, statutory or regulatory.35 Of course, 
§ 1983 did not apply to the circumstances in Bivens because the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics employed federal agents. Because they were not State 
or local agents, they were beyond the coverage of § 1983. 
Section 1983 was the basis for the primary argument that Justice Black 
advanced in his dissent in Bivens.36 Black reasoned that Congress knows 
how to enact a statute conferring a right of action because they did so in 
enacting § 1983.37  Justice Black’s rationale was that, if Congress wished 
to provide any protection against federal violations of Constitutional 
rights, they simply could have enacted a similar statute; absent that, courts 
should not get involved.38 The majority, however, felt otherwise as seen in 
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion, which states: 
[T]that damages may be obtained for injuries consequent 
upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal 
officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition. The 
present case involves no special factors counseling 
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress. The question is merely whether petitioner, if he 
can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation 
by federal agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is 
 
33 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J. concurring in the judgment). 
34 Id. at 389. 
35 This statute reads as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
36 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial 
mechanism normally available in the federal courts. “The 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right 
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws 
whenever he receives an injury.” Marbury v. Madison 
(1803). Having concluded that petitioner’s complaint 
states a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment, we 
hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money damages 
for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents’ 
violation of the Amendment.39 
This was indeed a landmark decision of the Supreme Court, 
recognizing that there can be redress directly under the Constitution even 
absent a statute conferring a right of action to sue.40 
III. HALFTIME: THE BRIEF VIABILITY OF THE 
LANDMARK 
Bivens is currently under attack by the U.S. Supreme Court. Since 
1971, there have only been three cases after Bivens that have ruled that one 
can sue directly under the Constitution for violations of rights. The first 
was the case of Davis v. Passman in 1979.41 Davis involved discrimination 
against a female staffer on the basis of sex by a Member of Congress.42 
She sued under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution for due process 
violations.43 The Court upheld her suit and found that the Bivens claim 
would be heard and that she could sue under that doctrine for damages.44 
The second case was the following year, Carlson v. Green in 1980, 
which involved a federal inmate who suffered from asthma.45  The jailers 
disregarded his plight, he suffered for quite a long time, and he ultimately 
died.46 His estate sued for damages for Mr. Green’s death and, again, the 
Court recognized an implied right of action, this time under the Eighth 
Amendment provision that prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishments.47 
 
39 Id. at 395-397 (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas, Stewart, White, and Marshall, JJ.) 
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803)). 
40 See id. 
41 David v. Passman, 442 US. 228 (1979). 
42 Id. at 231. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 230. 
45 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 n.1 (1980). 
46 See id. 
47 Id. at 24-28. 
64 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
The only other case in which a Bivens claim has been recognized since 
1980 was a case that actually slips through the cracks of the opinions of 
the various Justices on the Supreme Court who have emphasized the 
desuetude of Bivens.48 Said case, however, recognized a cause of action 
under a Bivens analysis.49 In 1994, in Farmer v. Brennan, Dee Farmer, a 
pre-operative male-to-female transgender federal inmate, was described in 
the complaint as particularly vulnerable to sexual attack because she 
projected feminine characteristics and because of her transgender 
orientation.50 Farmer was repeatedly raped in prison and she ultimately 
wanted to be transferred to a different male facility, but her request was 
denied; instead, the federal authorities transferred her to a maximum 
security penitentiary, which is where the most dangerous criminals are 
held.51 Predictably, she was subject to more rapes and was brutally beaten 
by one of the other inmates.52 After having gone through Hell before her 
case was heard by the Supreme Court, and in an opinion by Justice Souter 
without dissent, a cause of action was recognized once again under the 
Eighth Amendment for the unconstitutional actions taken against Farmer 
by the federal authorities.53 Thus, there are but three cases since Bivens 
was decided in which the Supreme Court recognized the right to sue for 
damages directly under the Constitution. 
IV. THE HANDOFF: THE INCREMENTAL REJECTION OF 
BIVENS 
In the interim, there were eight cases before the 2017 decision in 
Ziglar v. Abbasi and the 2020 case of Hernandez v. Mesa that foreclosed 
an action for damages in the federal courts directly under the 
Constitution.54 In Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, the Court 
rejected an Eighth Amendment suit against a private halfway house 
operator.55 Similarly, in Minnecci v. Pollard, in 2012 the Court rejected a 
claim for damages in an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at 
a private prison.56 Both Eighth Amendment cases failed, despite  the fact 
 
48 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831 (1994). 
49 Id. 
50 See id. at 821. 
51 See id. at 835 (Blackmun, J. concurring). 
52 See id. 
53 Id. at 830. 
54 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Hernandez v. Mesa 140 S. Ct. 735 
(2020). 
55 See Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
56 Minnecci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012). 
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that Carlson v. Green and Farmer v. Brennan were both Eighth 
Amendment cases in which the Court had recognized Bivens claims. 
Similarly, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had recognized a 
Fifth Amendment due process claim in Davis, the Court rejected a due 
process race discrimination claim against military officers in Chappell v. 
Wallace;57 a substantive due process claim against military officers in 
United States v. Stanley;58 a procedural due process claim against Social 
Security Administration officials in Schweiker v. Chilicky;59 a procedural 
due process claim against a federal agency for wrongful termination in 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Meyer;60 and a due process suit 
against officials from the Bureau of Land Management in Wilkie v. 
Robbins.61 Although the case of Bush v. Lucas was brought under the First 
Amendment,62 like Davis v. Passman it was a claim against a federal 
employer. With the exception of Farmer, over the course of five decades 
the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to recognize a Bivens cause of action. 
V. THE PUNT INTO THE END ZONE: THE COURT’S 
INSISTENCE ON ACTION BY CONGRESS 
The Court’s refusal to recognize Bivens actions came to a head with 
its decisions in Ziglar v. Abbasi63 in 2017 and Hernandez v. Mesa64 in 
2020. Ziglar was a four to two decision with Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, 
 
57 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (“Taken together, the unique disciplinary structure of the 
Military Establishment and Congress’ activity in the field constitute ‘special factors’ which 
dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type 
remedy against their superior officers”) (unanimous opinion of Burger, C.J.). 
58 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (Scalia, J., for the majority). 
59 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (“The creation of a Bivens remedy 
would obviously offer the prospect of relief for injuries that must now go 
unredressed . . . .The prospect of personal liability for official acts, moreover, would 
undoubtedly lead to new difficulties and expense in recruiting administrators for the 
programs Congress has established.”) (O’Connor, J., for the majority). 
60 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484 (1994) (“If we 
were to recognize a direct action for damages against federal agencies, we would be 
creating a potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government.”) 
(unanimous opinion of Thomas, J.). 
61 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (Souter, J., for the majority). 
62 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385-386 (1983) (“Federal civil servants are now 
protected by an elaborate, comprehensive scheme that encompasses substantive provisions 
forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and procedures -- administrative and judicial -- 
by which improper action may be redressed. Constitutional challenges to agency action, 
such as the First Amendment claims raised by petitioner, are fully cognizable within this 
system.”) (Stevens, J., for the majority). 
63 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
64 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020). 
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and Gorsuch taking no part in the decision.65 The majority opinion was 
authored by Justice Kennedy.66 Ziglar essentially established a two-part 
test to consider claims under the Constitution for damages against federal 
officials.67 The first prong is “whether the request involves a claim that 
arises in ‘a new context’ or involves a ‘new category of defendants.’”68 
The Court goes on to make it clear that its “understanding of a ‘new 
context’ is broad. We regard a context as ‘new’ if it is ‘different in a 
meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court.’”69 The 
second prong is whether there are any special factors counseling hesitation 
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.70 
Ziglar v. Abbasi involved six individuals who sued various federal 
officials and officers in the detention facility where they were housed.71 
Five of them were Muslim and one was South Asian.72 They were rounded 
up shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001.73 These detainees were 
held incommunicado for three to six months and were subjected to what 
could be characterized as cruel and unusual punishments, including 
torture.74 They were subjected to sleep deprivation, lights were left on for 
twenty-three hours a day; they were held in tiny cells; and some had bones 
broken.75 They were left without recourse and without any ability to 
redress their situation during the time of their detention.76 The six 
individuals were detained on the basis of alleged immigration violations, 
which are civil offenses subject to adjudication in immigration courts, 
which are civil tribunals. They were not charged with crimes. Shockingly, 
during the deplorable course of action that federal officials took, they were 
aware that the six individuals were innocent of any terrorist activities. 
Despite this information, the six innocent individuals were detained for 
 
65 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct., at 1843. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. at 1859. 
68 Id. at 1876 (Ginsburg, J. and Breyer, J. dissenting). 
69 Id. at 1864. 
70 Id. at 1848. 
71 Id. at 1853. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1854 (“Guards allegedly slammed detainees into walls; twisted their arms, 
wrists, and fingers; broke their bones; referred to them as terrorists; threatened them with 
violence; subjected them to humiliating sexual comments; and insulted their religion.”). 
Because the case reached the Court on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, the Court assumed the facts alleged as true. Id. at 1853. 
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months on end in horrible conditions.77 The Supreme Court nonetheless 
rejected the Ziglar respondents’ Bivens claims.78 
To put this into historical context, there was another case decided by 
the Supreme Court a week after it issued its decision in Ziglar. Hernandez 
v. Mesa was filed in 2015 after a fifteen-year-old boy was killed by a 
Customs and Border Protection agent.79 The boy was playing a game with 
his friends in the culvert between Ciudad Juárez on the Mexican side of 
the border and El Paso on the American side.80 At the time of the incident, 
the young man, Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, was going up to the 
fence on the American side, touching it, and running back to the Mexican 
side.81 The game that Sergio and his buddies were playing irritated Mr. 
Mesa, the Customs and Border Protection agent who was on the American 
side. When Sergio got back to the Mexican side, Mesa fired two shots, the 
second of which hit Sergio in the face and killed him.82 According to the 
complaint, Sergio was unarmed and unthreatening at the time.83 
His parents brought suit in federal court against the federal agent 
involved. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in an en banc 
per curiam opinion, decided the case partially in favor of Sergio 
Hernández, describing what the three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit had 
found: 
The panel opinion correctly describes the substantive due 
process claim as the agent, Mesa, showed callous 
disregard for Hernández’s Fifth Amendment rights by 
using excessive deadly force when Hernández was 
unarmed and presented no threat.84 
The first appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court resulted in a 2017 per 
curiam opinion in which the Court stated that it was undisputed that 
Hernández’s nationality and the extent of his ties to the United States were 
unknown to Mesa, the Border Protection agent, at the time of the 
shooting.85 Mesa did not know whether Hernández was Mexican, 
American, or Mexican-American at the time he fired the shots.86 On that 
 
77 Id. at 1873 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
78 See id. 





84 Hernandez v. United States, 785 F. 3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc, per curiam). 
85 Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017). 
86 Id. 
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basis, the Supreme Court remanded the case in light of Ziglar.87 The 
parameters of Ziglar, therefore, were instrumental in the ultimate 
resolution of Hernandez v. Mesa, which the Court decided in February of 
2020.88 In Ziglar, the Supreme Court was of the view that there could be 
seven different excuses that would constitute a sufficiently “new context” 
so as to preclude suit in the federal courts for damages under the Bivens 
doctrine.89 
The particular factors that constitute new contexts were critically 
discussed, one by one, by Justice Breyer, writing for both himself and 
Justice Ginsburg in dissent in the four to two Ziglar decision.90 The first 
new context is based on the rank of the officers; if there is a difference in 
rank of the defendant officers in question and the rank of the officers in 
Bivens or in the three cases that were decided subsequently on the basis of 
Bivens, that factor would preclude suit. The rejoinder is, “what does the 
rank of officers have to do with Constitutional violations and why should 
that matter?” There really is no good reason. 
The second new context is the Constitutional right at issue. If the 
reason for the Bivens decision is, as stated by Justice Brennan, to deter 
unconstitutional conduct by federal agents, why should the Constitutional 
right at issue matter? Moreover, there have been Bivens cases involving 
the Fifth Amendment, the right at issue in Ziglar. Because the respondents 
in that case were immigration detainees, the Eighth Amendment was 
inapplicable, so the cruel and unusual punishments to which they were 
subjected should have been cognizable as violations of their rights to due 
process of law. Hernández involved both Fifth and Fourth Amendment 
claims, the latter of which was the claim in Bivens itself. 
The third new context is the generality or specificity of the individual 
action. A group of people who are known to be innocent by the federal 
actors should be general or specific enough, however one reads the tea 
leaves of generality or specificity. Choose your poison. The federal actors 
were known, the violations were known, and all of the allegations had to 
be taken as true because of the 12 (b)(6) procedural posture of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the 
context of Hernández, shooting an unarmed, unthreatening boy should 
also speak for itself, no matter the level of generality or specificity. 
The fourth new context relates to the extent of judicial guidance. The 
courts well know what the Constitution requires. Indeed, interpretation of 
 
87 Id. 
88 Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740 (2020) Justice Gorsuch did not participate in 
the case. Like Ziglar, the Court assumed the facts as true because the case was dismissed 
pursuant to a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
89 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. 
90 Id. at 1881-1882. 
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the Constitution is perhaps the most important function of the federal 
courts. Turning to the courts for judicial guidance in a future Bivens case 
should involve the same type of evidentiary analysis as in previous cases. 
The fifth new context is the statutory or other legal mandate under 
which the officer was operating. The legal mandate, however, is 
analytically distinct from the Constitutional violation. If the action of the 
federal officer is based on a legal mandate but involves a Constitutional 
violation, under the Supremacy Clause, the Constitutional right supersedes 
the mandate. 
The sixth new context is the risk of disruptive judicial intrusion. This 
factor is particularly problematic from an analytical perspective. The 
Court in Ziglar and later in Hernández was of the view that the Court 
should not get involved because, after all, Congress should authorize such 
lawsuits. The argument goes that, absent such authorization, it is an 
arrogation of the role of Congress for the courts to declare the bounds of 
Constitutional rights and provide remedies. When one considers that the 
federal courts often enjoin federal conduct — on a nationwide basis in 
many cases — an individual suit for damages pales by comparison. The 
Court’s concern rings hollow when one considers what the federal courts 
do and have done since the inception of the Republic. 
The seventh and last context is denominated “other potential special 
factors.” Justice Breyer even declined to respond to that factor because the 
majority opinion fails to elucidate what these “other potential special 
factors” might be.91 We would simply be engaging in speculation as to 
what Justice Kennedy might have had in mind when he referenced these 
“other potential special factors” in his opinion in Ziglar. Suffice it to say 
that the Court left itself an out to come up with anything it wants to deny 
a cause of action against federal officers. 
New contexts, therefore, will preclude suit. If the case does involve a 
new context, the courts should then proceed to consider whether there are 
any special factors that counsel hesitation in granting the “extension” of 
Bivens.92 Interestingly, the Court in Hernandez does not include the full 
phraseology used in Bivens (“special factors counseling hesitation in the 
absence of affirmative action by Congress”).93 In Bivens, the Court uses 
that phraseology to reference the fact that Congress had never expressed 
any hostility to the recognition of suits against federal actors without 
 
91 Id. at 1882. 
92 Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. at 743 (2020). 
93 Compare id., with Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; see also Anya Bernstein, Congressional 
Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is Special about Special 
Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719 (2012). 
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statutory authorization.94 There had never been a statute prohibiting such 
a cause of action, and there was never any indication in any federal statute 
that such suits should not be cognizable in the federal courts. In fact, under 
common law, the federal courts were there to provide remedies in all kinds 
of cases. That is the very reason that Bivens invoked Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison.95 
Moreover, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)96 and the Westfall 
Act,97 which amended it, are the only statutes that might bear on the subject 
of the intent of Congress with respect to Bivens. Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion in Ziglar observes that, “[i]t is by now well established 
that federal law provides damages actions . . . where claims of 
constitutional violation arise. Congress has ratified Bivens actions, 
plaintiffs frequently bring them, courts accept them, and scholars defend 
their importance.”98 By enacting the FTCA and the Westfall Act, an 
amendment to the FTCA, Congress was not redacting Bivens. Justice 
Breyer recognizes “that it is consequently ‘crystal clear that Congress 
views [the Federal Tort Claims Act] and Bivens as [providing] 
complementary causes of action;’”99 and Congress’ subsequent silence 
amounts to a strong sign that it accepted Bivens actions as part of the law. 
There is no evidence in any statute that Congress meant to foreclose a 
damages remedy under Bivens. In Carlson the Court itself affirmed that 
proposition, observing that, “not only was there no sign that Congress 
meant to preempt a Bivens remedy, but there was also clear evidence that 
Congress intended to preserve it.”100 “Congress, although well aware of 
the Court’s decision in Bivens, [ ] has not endeavored to dislodge the 
decision.”101 Ultimately, the Court’s elimination or limitation of Bivens 
actions is actually inconsistent with Congressional intent, and the Court’s 
 
94 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 397 (1971). “The absence of a congressional proscription of damages remedies for an 
equal protection violation tilted away from finding a special factor.” Glenn Larkin, A Tale 
of Two Shootings: Should a Bivens Remedy Be Available When CBP Agents Shoot and Kill 
Victims on the Mexican Side of the Border, 42 UALR L. REV. 171, 176 (2019) (citing Davis 
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979)). 
95 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-397. 
96 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988). 
97 Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680; see generally Carlos M. Vasquez & Stephen 
M. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 509 (2013). 
98 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017). 
99 Id. at 1879 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980)). 
100 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (emphasis added). 
101 Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 758 (2020) (dissenting opinion of Ginsburg, J., 
joined by Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, JJ.) (internal citation omitted). 
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reluctance to acknowledge Bivens actions sets an unfortunate, indeed even 
a lawless, precedent.102 
The criterion of “special factors” has now been turned upside down. 
Since at least 2017, the Supreme Court has been explicit in its holdings 
that, until Congress authorizes such suits and until it legislatively confers 
a private right of action, the courts should not get involved — precisely 
the opposite point that was made by the “special factors” language in 
Bivens. As Justice Alito characterized it, “[C]ongress’ decision not to 
provide a judicial remedy does not compel us to step into its 
shoes  . . . .When evaluating whether to extend Bivens, the most important 
question ‘is “who should decide” whether to provide for a damages 
remedy, Congress or the courts?’ The correct ‘answer most often will be 
Congress.’”103 
Another point that is made in both Ziglar and Hernandez is that the 
special factor counseling hesitation absent affirmative action by Congress 
also includes a consideration of national security.104 This is a particularly 
interesting and somewhat ironic factor when you consider what was 
actually involved in the cases of both Ziglar and Hernandez. 
In Ziglar, the basis for the national security rationale was that the 
respondent immigration detainees were detained because they might be 
terrorists.105 Not only was it known by the petitioners that the detainees 
were not terrorists but, most importantly, the only issue in the case was the 
conditions of confinement. There was nothing in the case relating to the 
reasons for the arrest, and there was nothing in issue about the predicate 
actions that the federal actors might have considered before the arrest. The 
primary question in the case was whether the harm and suffering that 
resulted from the authorization of this torture and unconstitutional 
treatment should be compensated.106 National security is a red herring in 
Ziglar. This is particularly ironic given Justice Kennedy’s quotation in 
Ziglar of the Court’s opinion in Mitchell v. Forsyth that “national security 
concerns must not become a talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims 
– a ‘label’ used to ‘cover a multitude of sins.’”107 Unfortunately, Justice 
Kennedy’s admonition seems to be nothing more than lip service. 
In Hernandez v. Mesa, a similar analysis obtains. The Court says there, 
“we have said that ‘matters relating to the conduct of foreign relations are 
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be 
 
102 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1884 (2017) (Breyer, joined by Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
103 Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 750 (2020) (internal citations omitted). 
104 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1861; Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. 735 at 757. 
105 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1853, 1865. 
106 Id. at 1854. 
107 Id. at 1852 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523 (1985)). 
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largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.’”108 The Court, 
therefore, uses foreign relations and national security as yet another excuse 
to foreclose a case involving clear violations of human rights. The 
observation the Court makes is that “since regulating the conduct of agents 
at the border unquestionably has national security implications, the risk of 
undermining border security provides reason to hesitate before extending 
Bivens into this field.”109 In fairness, there was somewhat of an 
international controversy in Hernandez because a sovereign nation 
invaded the space of another sovereign nation and, in so doing, took the 
life of someone. That being said, the Court’s opinion in the 2020 decision 
goes into great detail about the act taking place on foreign soil and thereby 
raises the question of extraterritoriality and the application of the 
Constitution in other countries.110 The fact of the matter is, however, that 
Customs and Border Protection agent Mesa was on United States soil 
when he shot the gun.111 That datum is incontrovertible, it was stipulated, 
and is not in issue. The question of cabining the actions of federal agents 
is fair game, if that federal agent has acted on United States soil. The 
question of national security or foreign relations, therefore, is yet another 
red herring. The tragic dimension of all this, of course, is that the Court 
has basically said what Justice Harlan admonished in his concurring 
opinion in Bivens: “For someone in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or 
nothing.”112 
The family of Sergio Adrián Hernández Güerica was relegated to 
nothing for their son’s murder: 
On the United States’ side, the Department of Justice 
conducted an investigation. When it finished, the 
Department, while expressing regret over Hernández’s 
death, concluded that Agent Mesa had not violated 
Customs and Border Patrol [sic] policy or training, and it 
declined to bring charges or take other action against him. 
Mexico was not and is not satisfied with the U.S. 
investigation. It requested that Agent Mesa be extradited 
to face criminal charges in a Mexican court, a request that 
the United States has denied.113 
 
108 Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. 735, 744 (2020) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 
(1981)). 
109 Id. at 747 (citing Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861). 
110 See id. 739-750. 
111 Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017). 
112 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
113 Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740 (2020). 
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The Court invoked the diplomatic relations between the United States 
and Mexico, excusing the murder because the United States took the 
position that this was a matter for diplomacy that should be worked out 
because it involves international dimensions.114 
From an international perspective, if the Court was so concerned with 
international law in this case, it might be well to consider the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — an international treaty to which 
the United States is a signatory.115 That treaty was ratified by the United 
States and, in the course of ratification, the United States issued 
reservations and understandings, which is not unusual when an 
international instrument is agreed to by a foreign state. The relevant 
provision of the treaty states: “[a]nyone who has been the victim of 
unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation.”116 Importantly, beyond the actual text of the treaty, the 
reservation that the United States lodged in agreeing to be bound by that 
international instrument provides: “[a]rticle 9 (5) requires the provision of 
effective and enforceable mechanisms by which a victim of an unlawful 
arrest or detention or a miscarriage of justice may seek and, where 
justified, obtain compensation from either the responsible individual or the 
appropriate governmental entity.”117 The concern with foreign relations 
and national security, therefore, rings hollow when one considers what is 
actually binding on the United States rather than some speculation about 
activities in a foreign country that involve extraterritoriality. It has been 
made abundantly clear in Ziglar and Hernandez that the Supreme Court 
will not entertain any future Bivens actions until Congress acts. 
The tragedy of Sergio Hernández is that it is not the only incident of 
its kind. Among many others, one other particularly egregious murder 
involved Rodriguez, another boy, who was sixteen years old when he was 
shot at least ten times.118 He was also on the Mexican side of the border 
when a Border Protection agent who was standing in Nogales, Arizona, on 
an embankment looking down on the Mexican side fired fourteen to thirty 
shots at Rodriguez.119 Rodriguez was still alive until the tenth shot crushed 
his cranium and killed him.120 There are reports that document instances 
 
114 Id. at 749-750. 
115 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 19, 1966, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U. N. T. S. 176. 
116 Article 9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 
19, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U. N. T. S. 176. 
117 U. S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, ICCPR, 138 Cong. Rec. 8071 
(1992). See also 1676 U. N. T. S. 544 (entered into force Sept. 8, 1992). 
118 Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F. 3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2016) 
119 Id. 
120 Id.; Gabriella Orozco, Bivens and Constitutional Integrity at the Border: Hernandez 
v. Mesa and Rodriguez v. Swartz, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 245 (2019). 
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of deaths caused and murder committed by Customs and Border Protection 
agents on United States soil shooting toward the Mexican side.121 
VI. THE PLAY THAT LEADS TO VICTORY: THE 
LEGISLATIVE FIX 
If it were not clear after Ziglar that the legal landscape has definitively 
changed because of the four to two line-up of the Court, any doubt was 
eradicated by the majority opinion of Justice Alito in Hernandez (2020), 
which reflected the views of a clear five-member majority of the Court.122 
More explicit is the concurring opinion filed by Justice Thomas, which 
was very similar to his concurring opinion in Ziglar.123 In Hernandez, 
however, he picked up another vote for the proposition that Bivens should 
simply be overruled, with Justice Gorsuch joining his opinion.124 It is clear, 
therefore, that the Supreme Court is not going to countenance any 
compensation cases under the Constitution before Congress acts. 
 A remedy for this problem essentially takes the language of the 
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and simply adds five words 
to that statute. The amended statute (addition in bold) would, therefore, 
read as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of the United States or of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects 
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress  . . . . 
This could be entitled the “FAIR Act,” also known as the “Federal 
Accountability Improving Responsibility Act.” Section 1983 already 
provides a right of action to sue State and local actors for violations of 
federal rights. The inclusion of the words “of the United States or” simply 
extends that private right of action to sue federal actors for such violations. 
Such an amendment would change the law to provide a statutory hook 
for compensatory relief against federal actors, such as those “little green 
 
121 Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 760 (Ginsburg, dissenting, joined by Breyer, 
Kagan & Sotomayor, JJ.) (citing authorities). 
122 See id. at 739-750. 
123 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
124 Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 750 (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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men” who invaded Portland, injuring peaceful protestors with munitions, 
and those who forcibly pushed aside the crowd in Lafayette Square, using 
tear gas and violating people’s Constitutional rights. As previously 
explained, an injunction, of course, would not have helped that young man 
who had to have surgery because of having a rubber bullet implanted in 
his face, and a motion to suppress certainly would not provide redress 
because these were peaceful protesters not involved in criminal activity. 
As Justice Harlan succinctly stated the obvious in his concurring opinion 
in Bivens, “it is damages or nothing.”125 
VII. THE NEXT GAME: THE CONCOMITANT PROBLEM 
OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The availability of a cause of action, however, does not solve all of the 
problems that face us with regard to suits against governmental officials. 
Although this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, one of the other 
major issues in suits against governmental actors for unconstitutional 
conduct is the question of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is the 
doctrine that allows a governmental defendant to get off the hook if it 
cannot be shown that there was a violation of “clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”126 In many cases, if not most, this doctrine essentially forecloses 
any relief.127 
There have been several initiatives to address the qualified immunity 
side of this problem of accountability, including a bill introduced by 
Senators Booker and Harris entitled the “Justice in Policing Act” that 
would essentially end qualified immunity.128 Another bill that has been 
introduced in the Senate is called the “Preventing Authoritarian Policing 
Tactics in America’s Streets Act of 2020.”129 On the House side, as of the 
date of this writing, two bills have been introduced — the Ending 
 
125 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
126 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
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127 E.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. ___ (2018) (granting immunity to an Arizona police 
officer who shot a “composed and content” mentally impaired woman who was standing 
“stationary” holding a knife while speaking with her roommate from a distance when he 
opened fire, because the officer had not violated “clearly established law”). 
128 Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2019-2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7120/text. 
129 Preventing Authoritarian Policing tactics in America’s Streets Act of 2020, S.4220, 
116th Cong. (2019-2020) https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
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Qualified Immunity Act of 2021,130 and a bill that actually passed the 
House of Representatives in June 2020 entitled the “George Floyd Justice 
and Policing Act.”131 Such proposed legislation can effectively address the 
qualified immunity part of the problem, but to address the evisceration of 
Bivens and the lack of a right of action, a statute enacted by Congress is 
necessary. Only then could justice be done when federal actors run amok 




130 Qualified Immunity Act of 2021, H.R. 288, 117th Cong. (2020-2021), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/288?s=1&r=1 
131 George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, 116 H. Rpt. 434, 116th Cong. 2d Sess. 
(June 19, 2020). 
